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1. Introduction 
The major financial crisis emerged in Europe at the end of 2008 and 2009 marked a 
hard period for many countries’ public finances. Especially countries in Southern 
Europe showed high unemployment and debt levels, which resulted in serious 
economic difficulties. In Greece, the crisis was officially inaugurated at the 
Eurogroup meeting held in October 2009 in Luxembourg. The Greek government 
announced that the country’s deficit was about to reach a percentage of over 12% 
(Chrysoloras, 2013). In the previous years, the rates of unemployment remained low 
and the economy was enjoying a period of general stability. The 2004 Olympic 
Games that were held in Athens and the country’s membership in the Eurozone 
contributed positively to the overall picture (Pagoulatos and Triantopoulos, 2009). 
The situation changed abruptly when the international crisis broke out. The economic 
prosperity was soon replaced by a gradual financial deterioration and deeply unstable 
political conditions followed.  
         Among the EU member-states, Greece was the first to accept a bailout package, 
an acceptance that had not only financial, but also electoral consequences and even 
brought changes in the existing party system (Gemenis and Nezi, 2012). Every Greek 
citizen has realized that the country faces severe financial problems and wonders 
whether the government with its unsuccessful policies, is the one to blame for. A 
phenomenon that appeared in all the core Southern European countries after the 
emergence of the recession, was the ousting of the government parties, a fact that 
reflected an initial loss of trust and confidence among voters. In recent years, 
“incumbent punishment” seems to have emerged as the distinctive characteristic of 
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Southern European elections (Bosco and Verney, 2012: 142) and a dominant tendency 
in Greece. 
          A great amount of literature suggests that the state of the economy matters in 
electoral context. Voters often use information about the financial situation of the 
country to evaluate the performance of the government according to their 
expectations. Various models have predicted that a bad economy causes the decline of 
electoral support for the ruling party. During the last few years, unprecedented results 
have been produced in several European national elections, as regards the defeat of 
parties in government on the one hand, and the rise of new, small parties on the other. 
Prime ministers’ turnover in numerous democratic countries is now a frequent 
phenomenon and is closely related to the economic deterioration. (Colomer and 
Magalhaes, 2012). In the Greek case, the defeat concerns the loss in votes of the two 
traditional major parties, which seems to have benefited the smaller opposition 
parties. 
         The aim of the present research is to examine the consequences of the current 
economic crisis on the voting behavior of Greek citizens. The study seeks to discover 
the degree of influence of the economic factor on the Greek electoral behavior and 
whether this impact resulted in electoral volatility and a loss of trust in the 
government party, after the emergence of the crisis. The general research question can 
be formed as follows: What are the consequences of the current economic crisis on 
the voting behavior of the Greek citizens? And more specifically, the question that 
will be addressed in the study is: Is there a loss of trust in the two Greek major 
political parties and a shift to alternative competing parties because of the poor 
economic situation of the country? 
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2. Literature Review 
In this section, the fundamentals of economic voting are initially reviewed, in order to 
give insights into the relationship between the economy and the vote. The two basic 
approaches related to the direction of voters’ attention are discussed; the retrospective 
voting and the reward-punishment hypothesis and the opposed theory of prospective 
voting. Attention is also paid to citizens’ motivations when making economic 
assessments, by explaining the distinction between the sociotropic and pocketbook 
voting. Subsequently, the main approaches that explain party choice are also 
reviewed, as well as the views around the salience of the economic issue as a 
predictor of vote choice nowadays. Finally, the Greek case is analyzed, pointing out to 
the major political events that took place after the breakout of the crisis and the 
factors that have been observed to affect the Greek voting behavior traditionally.   
 
 
2.1 Retrospective voting and the reward-punishment hypothesis 
“Every election is a judgment passed upon the record of the incumbent party” 
(Downs, 1957). Many scholars have examined the impact of the economy on vote 
choice, relying on the study of economic voting. The core idea of the theory refers to 
the reward-punishment hypothesis, which basically states that “when the economy is 
good, voters will reward the incumbent with their vote. Conversely, “when the 
economy is bad, voters will punish the incumbent by voting for the challenger” 
(Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2007: 518). Survey research has studied and analyzed 
the economic voting in many democratic countries. Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 
attempted to give answers to the questions related to the focus of the voters and 
devoted attention to the retrospective and prospective voting. The retrospective 
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approach, as introduced by Key, holds that voters are “past-oriented” and choose to 
vote for a party based on its prior performance in the government (Key, 1966; Fiorina, 
1981). Additionally, sanctioning models assume that voters reward the incumbent 
parties when overseeing a good economy in their country and punish them when the 
economy does not manage to reach at least the lowest desired level (Ferejohn, 1986; 
Key, 1966). Even though voters may not be well-informed or interested in politics, 
they are able to make political decisions based on feelings and observations of the 
results of governmental policies (Fiorina, 1981).  
 
 
2.2 Prospective voting 
“Each citizen votes for the party he believes will provide him with higher utility than 
any other party during the coming electoral period” (Downs, 1957: 38). The 
prospective approach, as explained mainly by Anthony Downs (1957), suggests that 
voters look to the future and compare performances according to their expectations 
from the competing parties. Since elections are the means for citizens to hold political 
elites accountable, they do not only assess past performances but also choose among 
different future options. Voters can evaluate the government’s management of the 
economy, compare it to some alternative and make their choice accordingly (Hellwig, 
2012: 93). They use information about the positions and policies of incumbents 
relative to party challengers before casting their vote and the opposition can hope for 
electoral support when the economic policy-making of the ruling party is proved 
insufficient (Lewis-Beck, 1988). Fiorina, Lewis-Beck and other scholars have found 
that in several- especially presidential- elections, voters act prospectively as well 
(Fiorina, 1981; Lewis-Beck, 1988). Competency-based selection models state that the 
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economic voting is not only associated with sanctioning past actions, but also with the 
selection of candidates according to future expectations (Duch and Stevenson, 2008). 
Hellwig adds that in hard economic times, voters often decide not to cast their vote in 
favor of the incumbent party, not only for the purpose of punishment, but also because 
alternative parties express distinct policy programs and positions (Hellwig, 2012: 93).  
         The prospective theory basically states that voters apart from judging past 
government actions and economic performances, are also strongly interested in the 
forthcoming performances and assess them according to their benefits. Nevertheless, 
voters are not sure whether these expectations will become real and whether parties 
will actually keep their promises about their future proposals, so they usually act 
retrospectively in their assessments. And even if they act prospectively, past 
performances shape future expectations significantly (Fiorina, 1981).  
 
 
2.3 Economic Evaluations: Sociotropic and Pocketbook Voting 
Studies on the economic voting theory have pointed out to another distinction, which 
is related to the type of economic conditions that people consider when casting their 
vote. If citizens consider the national economic situation when making political 
decisions, their consideration is called sociotropic. In contrast, when voters focus on 
their personal financial situation, they make their choice according to their 
pocketbook.  
         The conventional wisdom among political leaders, citizens and scholars is that 
voters are more interested in their household financial situation, rather than the 
economy of the nation (Nezi, 2012; Evans and Andersen, 2006). However, most 
findings indicate that the nation is considered a more important object and the 
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national economy matters more to vote choice than the personal finances (Lewis-Beck 
and Stegmaier, 2007). Voters seem to be more “sociotropic than egotropic”, however 
this varies from country to country (Lewis-Beck and Paldam, 2000). Evans and 
Andersen (2006) examined the relationship between party support and economic 
voting, both pocketbook and sociotropic, in the British case and found that egocentric 
economic assessments are not likely to have an effect on party support or vice versa.  
 
 
2.4 The Economic Issue as a significant predictor in Electoral Context 
The main criticism of the economic voting theory is that it neglects the importance of 
other factors that can be decisive in electoral outcomes. It has been found that in many 
democratic electoral contests, the economic issue is not the main focus of the voters 
and that several other factors, such as leadership competence, cultural issues (religion, 
race etc.), corruption scandals and other country specific issues, provide important 
reasons for discontent (Colomer and Magalhaes, 2012). In the Greek case for 
example, government corruption scandals that broke out in recent years, resulted in 
great dissatisfaction among voters1 (Bosco and Verney, 2012: 133).  
         Nevertheless, the salience of the economic crisis has been increasing in public 
discussions and in voters’ concern since 2008 and seems to have become prevalent in 
the most recent European elections. Voters have started considering the economic 
factor more, after observing the deterioration of the quality of their lives.  The 
destabilizing consequences caused by the economic crisis create a serious “economic 
                                                          
1 According to a factor analysis conducted by Kayotis and Rüdig (2013) seeking to discover the 
dimensions of blame attribution, based on the results of the 2010 local elections, 74% of the Greek 
citizens considered corruption as “extremely responsible” for the crisis. 
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pain” and at the same time, they make voters realize that they have elected the wrong 
government (Bosco and Verney, 2012).  
         Studies on German and British data show that the electorate responds to the 
economic situation only when it deteriorates to a high degree. This is known as the 
“asymmetry of the economic evaluations” (Nezi, 2012: 500). It seems that negative 
evaluations of the economy have greater impact on vote choice than positive and 
voters are more likely to act as punishers. Therefore, it is expected that when a nation 
is under economic prosperity, other short or long-term factors (such as partisan 
loyalties) are decisive for the electorate’s choice, whereas the economy seems to 
determine vote choice more, in times of financial instability.  
         In West European advanced democracies, economic perceptions play a crucial 
role for the parties’ electoral success (Lewis-Beck and Paldam, 2000). Additionally, 
several initial aggregate level analyses measuring macroeconomic indicators (GDP 
growth, taxation, inflation, unemployment etc.) have demonstrated that there is a high 
relevance between these measures and vote choice (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2007; 
Nadeau and Lewis-Beck, 2001). Individual level studies have also shown that there is 
a strong relationship between economic evaluations and vote choice, with blame 
attribution having an important conditioning effect (Karyotis and Rüdig, 2013; Nezi, 
2012). It should be noted however, that in some countries the financial crisis that 
emerged in 2008, did not have a significant effect on vote choice. Germany belongs to 
these cases, although it has been argued that it was the coalition government, that 
managed to handle the effects of the recession successfully (Rattinger and 
Steinbrecher, 2011).  
         The significant contribution of these studies is undoubted, due to the 
prominence of the economic issue in an important number of European elections in 
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the last few years. It is interesting to have a closer look at Greece and examine the 
relationship between the economy and the vote and specifically the decline of 
government support. The country offers an identical case to test and analyze this 
relationship, since the national economy is facing a serious downturn and all citizens 
are affected even at the lower extent (Karyotis and Rüdig, 2013). Additionally, the 
institutional context of the country facilitates blame attribution2, since the party 
system has not been characterized by coalition governments (the only exception was 
the 1989-1990 coalition government), but had been ruled by two main parties, which 
had been alternating in government until the recent 2012 elections. Consequently, it 
became easier for voters to recognize who they should held responsible for bad 
performance and for economic policies adopted (Nezi, 2012). The “responsibility 
hypothesis” is highly suitable for the explanation of economic voting in two-party 
systems (Lewis-Beck and Paldam, 2000). A limited number of studies have tested the 
relevance of the economic voting theory in the Greek case and most of them do not 
focus on elections held after the emergence of the euro crisis. Due to the very few 
findings on the economic voting theory in the Greek electoral context, the present 
analysis attempts to fill this gap and contributes to a more detailed examination of the 
impact of the crisis on voter’s decision. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 The “clarity of responsibility” has been pointed out by several scholars that examined the significance 
of the sociotropic voting effect. It has been demonstrated that smaller number of parties in government 
enhances the strength of economic evaluations since the target becomes clearer to voters (Lewis-Beck 
and Stegmaier, 2007).  
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2.5 Explanation of Party Choice 
While the focus of the present study is on the economic voting model, it is wise to 
review earlier theories of party choice for a complete understanding of voting 
behavior. Several theories of political behavior and party choice have appeared to be 
opponents of the economic voting theory, by emphasizing long-term factors such as 
social cleavages and party identification, or other short-term effects, such as issue 
voting and leadership performance (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2007).  
         Electoral studies in past decades interpreted electoral outcomes and voting 
behavior in Western Europe, relying on social cleavages and stable party preferences. 
Lipset and Rokkan (1967) assumed that party systems are formed on the basis of 
cleavage structure and that citizens’ behavior is affected by this structure, which has 
led to the creation of stable political alignments. They argue that in the European 
context, historical events (such as the Reformation and the industrial revolution) 
resulted in the formation of social alliances (Stokes, 1999: 247). Their work has been 
quite influential and many scholars of political behavior have focused on social 
divisions in societies that existed until the 1970’s (Thomassen, 2005). Nevertheless, 
the impact of these ideologies significantly declined, as social developments that took 
place (such as higher levels of education, the development of welfare state etc.) has 
led to changes in the relationship between politics and social structure and 
consequently to shifts in the electoral behavior of individual citizens. Thomassen 
(2005) argues that “a process of societal modernization” is taking place. Cleavage-
based theories have lost their importance in explaining voting behavior since the 
approach ignores, to some extent, the mutability of party systems (Stokes, 1999). 
Moreover, according to most recent theories, several socio-demographic factors are 
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important intervening influences in the relationship between the sense of belonging to 
a particular social group and voting for it. 
         Recent electoral studies of voting behavior have been largely influenced by the 
Michigan school of thought and the conceptual framework introduced in the 1960s. 
The approach focused on psychological affiliations and emotional ties that people 
develop with a specific political party (Campbell et al, 1969; Stokes, 1999). These 
scholars perceived party identification as a major determinant of political behavior 
along with several socio-demographic factors (since partisan cues are often inherited 
through the social and family environment of the person). Campbell et al. (1960: 128) 
in their work, state that the political party is an “opinion-forming agency of great 
importance” and that due to the complex nature of politics, citizens feel the need to 
have relatively “simple cues” to evaluate national political elements. These loyalties 
have proved to be of greater importance than other factors in a significant number of 
American elections. The left-right dimension has also been much emphasized in 
several studies, as a replacement of the older structural cleavages. In French politics 
the ideological orientation has been considered as an alternative to party loyalties 
(Thomassen, 2005: 15) 
         The party identification model has received much criticism by European 
scholars, since short-term issues gradually appear to be more influential in electoral 
outcomes. The modernization theory states that over time long-term factors will 
become less important and short-term factors will take their place as more crucial 
determinants of vote choice (Thomassen, 2005). Daily issues, evaluation of the 
government’s performance and political leaders attract voter’s attention quite often.  
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2.6 The Greek Case 
Greece, ever since the restoration of democracy in 1974, has been ruled by a single-
party majority government, always one of the two traditional major parties, New 
Democracy (ND) and the PanHellenic Social Movement (PASOK). The two parties 
combined, held the monopoly of around 85% of the vote, while all the other parties 
were following with much smaller percentages. The 2000 legislative Greek elections 
(when PASOK was elected third time in a row) strengthened the two-party system 
and its polarization3 (Lyrintzis, 2005). In the 2004 national elections, New Democracy 
became the ruling party, after eleven years of PASOK leadership and the results 
revealed again a clear competition between the two parties. In the following national 
elections in 2009, when the country’s debt had already reached high rates, PASOK 
was again elected with a majority percentage of 43.9% of votes (Nezi, 2012: 499). 
The results of these elections showed that the consequences of the crisis were largely 
approaching the country, as ND faced its worst electoral loss ever since democracy 
was reinstated in the country (Gemenis and Nezi, 2012).  
         In November 2011, the political tradition of the country was overturned when 
the new government became a coalition formed by three parties (PASOK, ND and the 
Popular Orthodox Rally Party), with the non-elected technocrat leader Loukas 
Papademos4 (Bosco and Verney, 2012). In the national elections of May 2012, none 
of the two big parties managed to gain a majority of votes. The defeat of the 
traditional parties that had been alternating in government in the previous years, was 
the unexpected result of the elections. It became clear that voters were deeply 
dissatisfied with past policies adopted. 
                                                          
3 PASOK was elected with 43.8% of the votes and ND received 42.7% (Lyrintzis, 2005). 
4 The only previous coalition government in Greece was formed in 1989, headed under the Prime 
Minister Tzannis Tzannetakis and lasted only 102 days. 
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         Meanwhile, during this period several new challenger parties that were not 
previously to the fore in the political scene (the characteristic of some of these parties 
is the turnover of the existing political system), started to gain electoral power. After 
the emergence of the crisis, these parties tried to create an anti-government climate 
and adopted negative positions concerning the acceptance of the bailout package 
(Colomer and Magalhaes, 2012). It has been observed that the recession created not 
only discontent with mainstream parties, but also an increasing support towards third, 
mainly radical parties. The polarization of the electorate seems to have increased, as 
one of the consequences of the European debt crisis (van Gent et al., 2013).  
         The phenomenon became initially apparent in the results of the 2010 Greek 
local elections, which were held a few months later than the acceptance of the first 
rescue package. Regional and local elections which are considered second-order 
elections, usually benefit small or new political parties (Karyotis and Rüdig, 2013). A 
small pole of left parties have always enjoyed a relative electoral strength, without 
however, causing any concern to the two dominant parties (Gemenis and Nezi, 2012). 
Surprisingly enough, the vote in favor of the biggest communist Greek party (KKE) 
reached, in those elections, double percentage in two of the three main municipalities. 
Another communist party, the Radical Left Coalition (SYRIZA), unexpectedly 
increased its vote5. A third unexpected outcome of the same local elections was the 
seat won by a radical left party, ANDARSYA (Anticapitalist Left Collaboration for 
the Overthrow). The results suggested that there might be a tendency towards the 
radicalization of the Greek electorate to the left (Bosco and Verney, 2012). Parties of 
the far right were also strengthened during this electoral period. A neo-nazi group 
called Golden Dawn, which had existed for many years on the sideline of the Greek 
                                                          
5 In the last national 2012 elections, the party won 71 parliamentary seats and became the second 
largest party in votes and an important competitor. 
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electoral system, managed to win a seat at the Athens city council. In these difficult 
economic times, the party succeeded in winning its first elected post in the local 
elections and 18 parliamentary seats in the national elections of June 2012. In 
contrast, a right-wing party named LAOS (Popular Orthodox Rally), which had 
supported the Greek bailout and in May 2010 was the only party in opposition that 
voted in favor of the Memorandum of Understanding, suffered a great loss in the 
elections a few months later (Gemenis and Nezi, 2012; Bosco and Verney, 2012: 
148). 
 
 
2.7 Economic measures and dissatisfaction among voters 
The economic policies and legislation that Greece adopted during this period included 
mainly the first memorandum of May 2010, the June 2011 midterm fiscal plan and the 
second memorandum of February 2012 under the agreement with the troika. The 
opposition held a different stance towards these economic measures and strategies and 
adopted an “anti-government and anti-memorandum” attitude, which seems to have 
turned to their benefit in the following elections. Some of these parties, that opposed 
the austerity policies and the agreement with the troika (SYRIZA, Golden Dawn, the 
Independent Greeks), were rewarded for their policy, by gaining votes far from all 
expectations (Gemenis and Nezi, 2012). 
         The adoption of such policies contributed to the spread of a protest wave across 
the nation during this period. Van Gent et al. (2013) state that political responses to 
the euro crisis include also street protests, marches and strikes. Citizens of those EU 
member states, that are affected stronger by the recession, mobilize against imposed 
economic policies and measures. Along with Spain and Portugal, Greece witnessed 
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the largest protests and mobilizations (especially those that took place in Athens and 
in Thessaloniki). After the decision of the PASOK government to impose the 
economic austerity measures to the Greek citizens in order to attain a fiscal balance, a 
series of protests began to take place in the whole country (Gemenis and Nezi, 2012). 
The number and size of mobilizations in 2011 was unprecedented and the sit-ins in all 
major cities of the country, lasted for more than 2 months6. Greek voters realized that 
their life was getting worse, due to the tax impositions and the increasing cuts in 
salaries and as a result, the protests became more massive and dynamic. The public 
has decided to use any possible means against those considered responsible for the 
whole situation. 
         The anger of the Greek citizens was also directed toward the European Union 
and its institutional bodies. In years of financial stability, the majority of Greek 
citizens had formed a positive opinion about the EU and the country’s membership. 
According to a 2011 Eurobarometer survey, Greeks do not feel confident in the 
effective role of the EU (Chrysoloras, 2013). In the context of the euro crisis, one 
crucial issue is the sharing of the competences at the EU level, resulting from the 
mixing of supranational and intergovernmental policy arenas (van Gent et al., 2013: 
136). As a consequence, voters do not only express support or dissatisfaction with the 
nation-state, but they also express favorable or unfavorable views on EU.  
Nevertheless, in most of these mobilizations, the citizenry did not target the EU 
policies directly, but actually requested the government to change its position on rules 
and measures imposed by the EU (van Gent et al., 2013).  
                                                          
6 The “aganaktismenoi” movement was one of the main demonstrations, inspired by the Spanish 
“indignados”, and organized in several Greek cities by protestors expressing indignation to the 
economic austerity policies (van Gent et al., 2013). 
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         The anti-European sentiment, born in several countries that have been hit hard 
by the economic recession, and in Greece as well, seems to have contributed to the 
increased support for populist right-wing or left-wing parties (Chrysoloras, 2013). 
These parties (some of them mentioned above), express anti-European feelings and an 
unsupportive attitude to the general agreement between the troika and the Greek 
government. Even Euro-rejectionism7, which is largely related to economic concerns, 
seems to dominate the policy programs of many, mainly extremist, parties (van Gent 
et al., 2013: 145).  
 
 
2.8 Turnout and Abstention 
The number of citizens that cast their vote in national elections is an important 
indicator of support for the country’s political system and political elites. In recent 
years, turnout has been decreasing and several studies have demonstrated that in 
poorer countries, levels of electoral participation are lower than in the more 
prosperous (Blais, 2007). During hard economic times, a refusal to participate in the 
electoral context is often observed and this abstention could be interpreted as a 
discontent with political and economic policies of incumbent parties. However, the 
cause of non-participation might also be seen as a form of protest or a general 
political indifference that existed prior to an economic crisis (Karyotis and Rüdig, 
2013). 
         Bosco and Verney (2012) argue that apart from the incumbent punishment, 
parliamentary fragmentation and the emergence of new, mainly extreme, political 
power, another electoral consequence of the Eurozone crisis is the rise of abstention in 
                                                          
7 Van Gent et al. (2013) use this term to define policies and attitudes which oppose (or simply do not 
support) ideas of European integration and express a general pessimist stance about the development. 
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Southern Europe. The Greek case demonstrates that an increasing number of citizens 
do not cast their vote in both regional and national elections in recent years, a stance 
that could be attributed to the dissatisfaction with the present economic situation. 
Surprisingly enough, this apathy in electoral participation appears in a country where 
voting has always been compulsory, although penalties are often not applied (Bosco 
and Verney, 2012). Nicolacopoulos (2005) argues however, that a gradually 
diminishing interest in politics is a characteristic of general transformations that 
emerged, with regard to the electorate’s shift of interest to new issues and the 
decreasing influence of political parties. In any case, alarming levels of low turnout 
are a significant indicator of political alienation and may prevent the proper function 
of the democratic political system. 
 
 
2.9 Traditional explanatory factors of Greek voting behavior 
Ideologically oriented voting and political patronage are major characteristics of the 
Southern European countries’ party systems (van Gent et al., 2013).  In the Greek 
case, the ideological views have played a significant role historically and have guided 
the voting behavior of many Greek citizens. During the 1980s, the Greek party system 
has been described as a case that can be classified in the model of “limited but 
polarized pluralism” (Lyrintzis, 2005). The model of polarized pluralism prevails in 
the Mediterranean Southern European countries and is characterized by ideological 
distance, historical political conflicts, clientelism, political parallelism and in some 
cases, by the existence of anti-system political parties (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). 
Nevertheless, these characteristics declined and Greece became a case of a two-party 
system. Additionally, some Greek parties have developed clientelistic relationships 
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for political support (especially the two traditional parties), however in the form of 
“bureaucratic clientelism”, replacing the old traditional clientelism. 
         Ever since the end of the military dictatorship, the left-right cleavage has been 
dominant in the Greek political scene, connected to the center (PASOK), right (ND) 
and left (KKE) bloc. PASOK was founded as the liberal party and ND as the people’s 
party with a conservative orientation. After the restoration of democracy, PASOK’s 
programme was perceived as a socialist oriented and the party developed strong 
connections with trade unions (Lyrintzis, 2005). ND had a conservative, right-wing 
orientation and the communist party KKE, was the dominant one in the left wing of 
the ideological continuum and the oldest party in the political scene. The left-right 
continuum has become a facilitative factor for Greek citizens in classifying the 
political parties and understand their ideological positions (Lyrintzis, 2005).  
          In recent years, the meaning of the three labels has undergone a substantial 
change (Lyrintzis, 2005). PASOK appears to have adopted a more modernizing 
character, a development that met strong criticism by the traditionalists and leftist 
supporters. Therefore, a possible explanation for the votes PASOK lost in the 2004 
elections, could be that citizens who positioned themselves on the left scale, often 
participate in demonstrations and used to vote for PASOK, were dissatisfied with this 
change and preferred to vote for more leftist parties. The disapproval however, 
became stronger from the time the austerity economic measures were imposed by the 
party, in order to manage the country’s exit from the crisis, after the 2009 elections 
when it was again elected (Karyotis and Rüdig, 2013). Moreover, the unprecedented 
defeat of ND in the 2009 elections, in a period when the crisis became apparent, 
reveals that the electorate might have been affected by other issues other than 
ideological views. Scholars of Greek politics have pointed out to a process of 
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modernization, not so with regard to the parties’ ideological character, but more in 
respect to the decline of the influence of political parties and the erosion of “the 
inherited cleavages of the past”. Nicolacopoulos (2005) argues that this development 
accompanies the emergence of new issues, transformations within the parties 
regarding the selection of new political leaders, the decreased popularity of the 
government and a convergence in terms of ideological views, composition of electoral 
base and policy positions of the two main parties. These transformations became more 
intense in the mid-1990s and resulted in electoral volatility. However from the 
elections of 2000, when PASOK increased its electoral strength, a reinforcement of 
the two-party system and a decline of partisan alienation was observed.  
         A large number of Greek voters have developed loyalties with a particular 
political party- mainly with the two traditional PASOK and ND, or with the 
communist party KKE- and continue to vote for the party they used to, unaffected by 
social, political and economic issues that have emerged in Greek society.  The may 
not take the economic issue into serious consideration, or they may perceive the 
situation more positively (Nezi, 2012). A study made by Freire and Costa Lobo 
(2005), about the influence of the economic perceptions on the voting behavior in 
three countries hit by the economic crisis- Portugal, Spain and Greece- offers some 
interesting findings. Having tested the effect of the economy on vote in the period 
1985-2000 in Greece, they found that the most significant effect on citizen’s choice, 
was the ideological orientation of the voters. However, their analysis does not include 
any elections after 2000. Magalhaes (2007) in a comparative analysis8 of eleven 
                                                          
8 The analysis was about the role of information on voting behavior, examining whether vote choice is 
affected by “informational biases” to which people are exposed during political campaigns (Magalhaes, 
2007). Socio-demographic characteristics and partisan attachments were controlled for in the analysis, 
to test their overall impact on vote for the incumbent. 
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countries, found that party identification is the strongest determinant of Greek 
electoral behavior (based on the 1996 legislative election). Results demonstrated that 
Greece comes second after Hungary in the significance of partisan identification on 
vote choice. The author also stated that evaluations of the economic situation were 
excluded, since they were not likely to have an impact on the long-term 
predispositions (Magalhaes, 2007: 230). Several factors might account for the partisan 
effect on vote in the Greek case, for instance the political preferences that are shaped 
within the family and friend environment, or historical events that led to the formation 
of traditional ideological cleavages.        
 
 
3. Theory and Main Concepts 
The research is designed to create a model on the relationship between the vote for the 
incumbent or for opposition parties and the perceptions of national economy. The aim 
is to discover any shift in electoral behavior from the time when the economic 
conditions of the country began to deteriorate sharply and whether this shift can be 
attributed to the economic conditions. Therefore, the research design manly relies on 
the economic voting theory and specifically the retrospective, sociotropic voting. The 
basic theoretical approach is the reward-punishment hypothesis, which predicts that 
when citizens perceive benefits from the national economy, they reward the 
incumbent party with their vote, otherwise they cast their vote for a challenger party. 
In short, it is argued that citizens make positive or negative assessments of the state of 
the economy and respond accordingly with their vote. The assumption that voters 
react more to bad economic conditions than to conditions of prosperity and thus 
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negative economic evaluations have a bigger effect on vote choice than positive, is 
also relevant to the present study.  
         A special weight is also given to the Michigan model of voting behavior, which 
is commonly used by scholars and which gives focus to the socio-demographic 
characteristics of the persons and their psychological attachment to a specific political 
party. The theory has great appeal for political science researchers, since it includes 
variables that explain vote choice much better than other factors and can fit into 
several contexts. However, developments and shifts over time demonstrate that the 
relationship between social position and voting behavior is changing and that short-
term factors’ influence is steadily increasing. It is assumed that retrospective 
judgments of the economy direct voter’s gaze more in recent times, along with other 
issues (which are not part of the present research).  
         In summation, the main concepts that are discussed in this research design are 
firstly the vote, which is translated as the support for the incumbent party or other 
parties and secondly, the economic factor translated as the satisfaction of the voters 
with the present state of the national economy. Additionally, unemployment and 
income evaluation are added to the model, which are more relevant to the egocentric 
evaluations. Other important factors to include- relevant to the electoral context in 
general and the Greek context in particular- are the party identification and the 
ideology of the voters which constitute the long-term predispositions. Finally, the 
socio-demographic characteristics of persons (age, gender, education) are included as 
well. 
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4. Hypotheses 
Based on the theories of the economic voting, the retrospective approach, the reward-
punishment hypothesis and the asymmetry of the economic evaluations, and taking 
into consideration the most recent developments in the Greek electoral landscape: 
The first hypothesis Η1 of the present study states that the two traditional incumbent 
parties in Greece lost electoral support due to the poor national economic conditions, 
as a result of the current financial crisis. 
And a second hypothesis Η2 derived from the first, states that after the onset of the 
economic crisis, a significant number of Greek voters shifted to competing, smaller 
parties that are not considered responsible for the national economic situation.      
         The economic factor is expected to have a negative impact on government or 
opposition support in the period of the economic crisis that prevails in the country. 
Although only retrospective voting is tested in the present study as the most relevant 
approach, it is likely that voters acted also prospectively. Foreseeing and future 
expectations about which Greek party may handle the economic problems of the 
country better, may have an effect on vote choice.  
 
 
5. Research Methods, Data and Case Selection 
This study examines the relationship between the economy and voting behavior in 
Greece. More speciﬁcally, the implications of the poor economic situation regarding 
support for the incumbent parties and third parties are tested. For this purpose, two 
election years are selected, the 2004 and 2009. A comparative analysis of the two 
election periods is made, which allows the observation of different effects before and 
after the breakout of the current financial crisis. Both national elections offer a good 
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opportunity to study the degree to which economic perceptions affect citizens’ 
political decisions, since in 2004 the country experienced a relative financial stability 
and in 2009 the economic crisis had just emerged (Nezi, 2012).  
         In order to provide answers to the research question and test whether the two 
hypotheses are confirmed or rejected, the research design is based on secondary data 
from the European Social Survey (ESS), specifically from the Individual Rounds 2 
and 5. The European Social Survey was established in 2001 and is a cross-sectional 
social survey that charts and explains the interaction between Europe’s changing 
institutions and attitudes, beliefs and behavior patterns of its diverse populations, by 
using a standard questionnaire on a nationally representative sample. The data for 
both surveys were collected in Greece shortly after the national elections had taken 
place, so they are suitable and adequate to be used for the investigation of the voting 
behavior of Greek citizens, before and after the onset of the crisis and observe any 
possible differences. The paper relies on questions from the core section of the ESS 
questionnaire, which focuses on a variety of social and political issues that are largely 
repeated in each round. The issues of the questions cover all the relevant factors that 
the present study aims to incorporate: economic, socio-demographic, long-term, as 
well as the vote choice.  Therefore, the study provides an individual level analysis and 
focuses on the Greek electorate -a random sample of Greek adults who have the right 
to vote- and on how economic retrospective sociotropic assessments about the 
condition of the economy are linked to the probability to vote for the incumbent party 
or an opposition party.  
         Many studies that examine the impact of the economic voting, tend to 
operationalize the vote variable as dichotomous (support for the government party and 
support for the opposition parties), however the dependent variable of this study –as 
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will be explained in the following section- has four outcome categories and the 
method of multinomial logistic regression was selected and performed. The logistic 
regression models are used so as to estimate the probability that the voter will select 
the government party or other parties and to examine how this distribution of 
probabilities shifts, when evaluations of the economy change (Nezi, 2012). Two 
statistical models are built for each election, based on the results of four multinomial 
logistic regression analyses conducted (two for the 2004 elections and two for the 
2009 elections). For each analysis, the incumbent party was selected as the reference 
category (PASOK for the first analysis and ND for the second).  
 
 
6. Operationalization and measurement 
6.1 Dependent variable: Vote choice 
For the investigation of the economic impact on the voting behavior of Greek citizens 
in the 2004 and 2009 elections, only voter’s support was initially handled as the 
dependent variable, since the outcome of the relationship under investigation concerns 
vote choice. Specifically, support for the incumbent party as well as support for the 
second Greek largest party and support for any third party in opposition was 
measured. The following coding procedure was selected; ‘1’ if the respondent voted 
for the incumbent party, ‘2’ if the respondent voted for the second largest party and 
‘3’ if the respondent voted for an alternative party. The vote for the second largest 
party was also included as an outcome value, since the first hypothesis of the study 
predicts that both traditional parties lost votes, from the time the economic crisis 
emerged in the country. Additionally, the votes in favor of the second largest party 
were selected as a separate, from the votes in favor of third opposition parties, 
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category, because the latter includes smaller parties that had not ever gained 
governmental power. 
         It is reminded that the Greek political system had been traditionally 
characterized as a stable two-party system and that with the exception of the coalition 
governments of 1989–1990, ND and PASOK had always been alternating in 
government, while all other parties remained in opposition gathering small percentage 
of the total votes. PASOK had been in office for many years until the 2004 
parliamentary elections, when the party was defeated by ND. ND incumbency lasted 
until the next parliamentary elections of 2009, when PASOK returned to power. 
         After measuring the levels of electoral participation in both election years, a 
large difference was observed. For this reason, non-voting was included as a fourth 
outcome category in the dependent variable of the study and was considered as 
another “vote option”. The category value was coded as ‘4’ and involved those 
respondents that did not cast their vote in both parliamentary elections. Table 1 shows 
the frequency distribution of the dependent variable of the study. It is clearly observed 
that in the levels of abstention increased dramatically in 2009; 9.5% of the 
respondents stated that they did not cast their vote in the 2004 parliamentary elections, 
whereas in the following elections, 20% of the respondents abstained. According to 
the sample, turnout in 2004 elections was relatively high; 1349 out of 1578 
respondents went to the polls.  
         In the politics section of the European Social Survey questionnaire, respondents 
were firstly asked whether they casted their vote or not in the last national elections: 
Some people don't vote nowadays for one reason or another. Did you vote in the last 
national election?  The respondents that replied “yes” were subsequently asked to 
name the party they voted for: Which party did you vote for in the last national 
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election? The question allows for the measurement of the votes in favor of all parties 
of interest. 
 
 
Table 1. Distribution of Votes and Abstention at 2004 and 2009 National Elections 
 2004 Elections 2009 Elections 
Incumbent Party 448* 
18,6% 
332** 
12,2% 
Second Largest Party 721** 
30% 
600* 
22,1% 
Third Parties 180 
7,5% 
278 
10,2% 
Abstention 229 
9,5% 
543 
20% 
Missing 828 962 
N  2406 2715 
*= Votes for PASOK, **= Votes for ND 
Source: European Social Survey 
 
Apart from the increased levels of abstention, two other observations can be made 
according to the sample distribution of votes: Firstly, the big winner of 2004 Greek 
parliamentary elections, New Democracy, appears clearly weakened in the next 
election. As mentioned earlier, the party faced the worst defeat in its electoral history. 
Moreover PASOK, although returned to power in 2009, did not obtain a large 
percentage of votes. Secondly, the support for third opposition parties has 
substantially increased (taking into account that the two traditional incumbent parties 
together, always had the monopoly of votes). 
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6.2 Independent and Control Variables 
The primary independent variable of interest is the economy, which is measured in the 
present study as the satisfaction of the respondents with the national economic 
conditions. It is assumed that satisfaction with economy depends on utility and 
economic benefits that the person receives from the current situation and that these 
perceptions are also dependent on the satisfaction of the person with the government 
performance. In other words, if the person is satisfied with the present state of the 
economy, it is assumed that he is also satisfied with the performance of the 
government and consequently he will vote for the incumbent party again. Conversely, 
feelings of dissatisfaction with the economic situation are related to a general 
discontent with the party in government, therefore it is expected that the individual 
will vote for an alternative party. The question in the survey that is handled as the 
indicator for sociotropic voting was formulated as: On the whole how satisfied are 
you with the present state of the economy in Greece? Responses to the question were 
coded to an 11 point scale, ranging from 0 if the person is “extremely dissatisfied with 
the national economy, to 10 if the respondent feels “extremely satisfied”. For reasons 
of simplification, the variable was recoded having 3 categories: the respondents that 
were dissatisfied with the economy (coded as ‘1”), the “neutral” respondents, 
meaning those that were neither dissatisfied nor satisfied with the state of the 
economy (coded as ‘2’) and those that felt satisfaction with the economic conditions 
(coded as ‘3’).  
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Table 2. Distribution General Satisfaction with the Economy at 2004 and 2009 National 
Elections 
 2004 Elections 2009 Elections 
Dissatisfied 1207 
50,2% 
2442 
89,9% 
Neutral 934 
38,8% 
236 
8,7% 
Satisfied 227 
9,4% 
33 
1,2% 
Missing 38 4 
N  2368 2715 
Source: European Social Survey 
 
This table shows the distribution of the main independent variable of interest. As it 
can be observed, the dissatisfaction with the state of the economy has doubled from 
the first to the second election year. In 2009 elections, almost 90% of the respondents 
felt discontent with economic situation of the country, while only 1.2% said they were 
satisfied. It is worth noting that the percentage of satisfaction is relatively low for the 
2004 election year, however many respondents (38.8%) also expressed neutral 
feelings about the economic conditions. The economy in that period was characterized 
by a relative financial stability and other factors, such as the identification of the 
respondents with ND or another party in the opposition, may have affected their 
economic evaluations. 
         Next to the question of the satisfaction with the economy, respondents were 
asked: Now thinking of the Greek government, how satisfied are you with the way it is 
doing its job? , with the same responses on the same scale. By answering this 
question, respondents express their general satisfaction with the government and this 
is handled as an important indicator for government support. As explained previously, 
it is assumed, that respondents who replied that they were satisfied with the state of 
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the economy in the previous question, were also satisfied with the way the 
government was doing its job. As noted in the survey questionnaire, the question 
referred to the leaders governing and the present regime. However, since the question 
was asked directly after the question on the satisfaction with the state of the economy, 
it is possible that respondents had in mind the economic policy-making. To draw 
certain conclusions on the relationship between the two variables, their statistical 
dependence will be tested as a starting point of the empirical analysis.  
         Based on the literature review, most studies consider that voting behavior is 
determined by temporary effects, such as the economic perceptions, by long-term 
predispositions, such as partisanship and ideological orientation and by demographics, 
such as gender, age and education (Clarke et al. 2004). The left-right continuum is 
useful in the simplification, description and categorization of the parties and the party 
system (Lyrintzis, 2005: 244). Additionally, the few existing studies on voting 
behavior of Greek citizens, have demonstrated that long-term effects are traditionally 
the most powerful predictors of party choice in Greece, therefore it is important to 
control for a variable measuring the degree of sympathy voters feel with one of the 
two main parties or with a third party. If the economic factor proves to be 
insignificant, then it is likely that Greeks were influenced by their ideology or their 
identification with the particular party when they casted their vote, so the effect of 
both predictors will be tested. 
         Besides, economic evaluations of citizens may be affected by partisanship. A 
problem often faced by analysts is the one of endogeneity and they control for party 
identification variables, since there is a concern that economic perceptions may be 
endogenous to partisanship (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2007; Karyotis and Rüdig, 
2013; Nezi, 2012). In the Greek case, it is likely that voters with strong ties to 
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PASOK or ND are more satisfied with the national economy, express a more positive 
view of the situation and oversee better economic conditions. This attachment will 
consequently lead them to the decision of voting again for the party they used to 
support. Voters may evaluate the economic conditions and attribute responsibility 
following their partisanship (Karyotis and Rüdig, 2013).  
         The interviewer asked the respondents the standard question of placing 
themselves on the left-right scale, which was a measure from 0 to 10: In politics 
people sometimes talk of "left" and "right". Using this card, where would you place 
yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right? Again for 
reasons of simplification, the variable was recoded including 3 categories: “left”, 
“center” and “right” (coded as ‘1’, ‘2’, ‘3’ respectively). To examine whether party 
loyalties affected the Greek electorate more than the economic conditions, the 
following question from the European Social Survey core questionnaire is chosen: 
Which party do you feel closer to? , in which the respondents were asked to name the 
party they sympathize, identify with or are most attached to, regardless of how they 
voted, as explicitly explained in the survey. The responses were recoded according to 
the 3 vote categories of the dependent variable (‘PASOK’, ‘ND’, ‘Third Parties’). The 
specific question was selected, in order to avoid any confusion with party choice. 
Prior to this question, survey respondents were asked whether there is a particular 
party they feel closer to than all the other parties. Relying on the asymmetry of the 
economic assessments and the strength of party loyalties in the Greek electoral 
history, it is expected that the party identification predictor will be a significant factor 
in the first year of analysis, and a non-significant factor in the second year.  
         As discussed in the literature review section, the Michigan model and other 
studies on voting behavior assume that the socio-demographic characteristics of the 
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person, determine vote choice largely. Several questions on the socio-demographic 
profile of the respondents, were included in the survey. Employment status is another 
major determinant of voting behavior in hard economic times and creates serious 
economic concerns. A few number of studies that have tested the impact of the 
economic issue on electoral choice, have found that voter’s employment condition 
matters to their decision (Nezi, 2012).  Analyses of British voting behavior, have 
demonstrated that high levels of unemployment are strongly connected to negative 
evaluations of the national economy9  (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2007).  
         Unemployment is measured in the present study as an important indicator of 
government support. Respondents of the European Social Survey were asked: Using 
this card, which of these descriptions applies to what you have been doing for the last 
7 days? Select all that apply, where respondents had to choose among the options “in 
paid work”, “unemployed and actively looking for a job”, “unemployed and not 
actively looking for a job”, “in education”, “retired”, “sick or disabled” etc. All the 
responses in the original dataset were included as separate dichotomous variables. The 
variable indicating whether the person is unemployed, but is actively looking for a 
job, was entered in the electoral model of study It is reasonable to assume that 
compared to Greek citizens that are employed, those who have lost their jobs or 
cannot find any, will react stronger to the present economic conditions.  
         A large protest wave has spread across the country in the last few years. Greece 
has witnessed large mobilizations and demonstrations, especially since 2011. To 
examine whether electoral choice has been affected by a “protest vote”, participation 
in demonstrations is also measured and controlled. Respondents were asked “whether 
they have taken part in a lawful public demonstration”, as an option to the general 
                                                          
9 Palmer and Whitten (2011 study on economic voting and the economic crisis in the United Kingdom, 
found that unemployment effect appeared to be strong after the emergence of the crisis in the country. 
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question: There are different ways of trying to improve things in Greece or help 
prevent things from going wrong. During the last 12 months, have you done any of the 
following? Participation in demonstrations and strikes against government policies 
and measures, is usually associated with people having more leftist ideological views 
(Karyotis and Rüdig, 2013). However, taking into consideration the number and size 
of mobilizations in recent years, it is assumed that discontent with incumbent policies 
comes from a larger number of voters, regardless of their ideological position. 
         Most studies on voting behavior also control for the education of the voters. The 
relevant question of the survey was formed as: What is the highest level of education 
you have achieved? The respondents were asked to select the education level they 
have completed. In the first survey the responses concerned the levels of a common 
academic framework (7 possible answers ranging from “illiterate/not completed 
primary level” to “post graduate degree”), whereas in the second survey the responses 
covered 15 educational stages in Greece. For both analyses, the responses were 
grouped into 3 categories; “basic level of education”, “medium level of education” 
and “high level of education” (coded as ‘1’, ‘2’, ‘3’ respectively). The last control 
variable of the analysis is the income evaluation. The relevant question was 
formulated as follows: Which of the descriptions on this card comes closest to how 
you feel about your household’s income nowadays? Four possible responses were 
given, ranging from “living comfortably on present income” to “finding it very 
difficult on present income”. Evaluations of the income status allows for the 
investigation of any pocketbook effect on the electorate’s choice.  
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         Finally, along with the variables described, the age10 and gender of the 
respondents are also incorporated to the models, to test whether they produced any 
significant effects on voting behavior. Four age groups were created, the first ranging 
from 18 to 29 and coded as ‘1’, the second from 30 to 49 and coded as ‘2’, the third 
from 50 to 69 and coded as ‘3’, and the last age group from 70 and higher and coded 
as ‘4’. In regard to the gender, male is coded as ‘1’ and female as ‘2’. 
         Several conclusions can be reached in regard to the effects of age, education and 
income on voting behavior. It is argued for instance, that young generations are more 
educated than the old ones and it is less likely to vote for the government party. It is 
also assumed that more affluent and educated citizens vote for right-wing parties, 
whereas less educated and affluent support left-wing parties. In respect to turnout, 
many studies confirm that age and education are significant factors in distinguishing 
voters and abstainers. It is also said that young generations have weaker party 
attachments and are less interested in politics, so it is more likely to abstain from 
voting, compared to previous generations (Blais, 2007).  
         The results will show to what extent the levels of satisfaction of Greek citizens 
with the economy (before and during the current economic crisis) are associated with 
the likelihood of government support, opposition support and non-voting and whether 
this effect is significant once powerful predictors of party choice in Greece- left-right 
placement and party identification- are controlled for, as well as the age, gender, 
education, unemployment, feelings about income and participation of respondents in 
demonstrations.  
 
 
                                                          
10 In both surveys, there were respondents under 18 years of age. Since the right to vote is granted only 
to adult citizens, these values were excluded from the analysis. 
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7. Empirical Results 
Moving to the main analysis, a Pearson’s correlation is performed as a starting point 
to test the H1 of the study. The degree of relevance between the economic factor 
measured as the levels of voter’s satisfaction with the present state of the economy 
and the levels of their general satisfaction with the national government is examined 
for both selected years. Logistic regression analyses are performed as a second step, 
to measure the effect of these assessments on the Greek voting behavior, initially 
along with the inclusion of the variables that indicate economic relationship and 
consequently once the remaining variables are controlled for. 
 
 
7.1 Bivariate Correlations 
As expected, the bivariate correlations demonstrated that the two variables represent a 
significant and positive relationship. The degree of satisfaction with the PASOK 
government and the degree of satisfaction with the state of the economy in 2004 are 
strongly correlated, r = .60, p < .001 (Table 3a, Appendix). Similarly, the satisfaction 
levels with the ND incumbency in 2009 have a high degree of coherence with the 
satisfaction levels with the economic situation in that period (again r = .60, p < .001, 
Table 3b, Appendix).  
         The results indicate that the two variables move to the same direction and 
specifically that high scores on the economic variable are associated with high scores 
on general satisfaction with the government and conversely, low scores on the 
economic variable are related to low scores on general satisfaction with the 
government, or in other words, related to discontent among voters. Therefore, if 
37 
 
voters consider that the financial situation of the country is poor, it is more likely that 
they will evaluate the government’s performance as bad.  
         The presence of dependence between the two factors has been demonstrated and 
now the direction of the relationship should be investigated, translated as the effect of 
the economic satisfaction on government support and support for third parties or no 
support, in the context of the 2004 and 2009 Greek elections.  
 
 
7.2 Logistic Regression Analyses 
For both elections, all variables were checked on multicollinearity and no high 
problematic dependence was found among the predictors or between a predictor and 
the dependent variable. All the assumptions were met for the model to be accurate, so 
the next step was to proceed to the regression analyses. For each year, two 
multinomial logistic regression models of electoral choice were designed to predict 
membership of the four outcome categories of the dependent variable. In the first 
model, only the economic variables were entered, the main variable of interest, 
satisfaction with the state of the economy, the income and the unemployment. This 
model was designed to test the effect of the sociotropic variable on voting preferences 
and whether this is influenced by the personal economic situation of the person.  
         In the second model, the rest of the variables were entered and controlled for, to 
evaluate the extent to which the effects found in the first model were dependent on 
other factors and especially those that were expected to be powerful predictors (party 
identification and ideology). The main observations are consequently explained and 
an assessment of what factors contributed significantly to the final model is made. As 
already mentioned, the support for the incumbent party was selected as the reference 
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category in every analysis, namely the votes for PASOK in 2004 and the votes for ND 
in 2009 election year. Incumbent votes were compared each time, with the votes for 
the second largest party, the votes for third parties and the “non-votes”. The logistic 
regression tables are included in the appendix of this paper (Tables 3a and 3b). 
 
 
7.2.1 The Elections of 2004 
First model 
The first model, containing only the economic variables was statistically significant χ2 
(18) = 110.25, p < .001, indicating that the model was able to distinguish between 
respondents who voted for the government party, for the second largest party, for 
third parties or did not vote. The model as a whole explained between 68% and 75% 
of the variance in vote choice and correctly classified 46.2% of cases. Among the 
three variables, the income and the satisfaction with the economy were equally 
significant contributors to the model, while the unemployment predictor was not 
significant in predicting membership of the four outcome categories.  
         The satisfaction with the economy was statistically significant in predicting the 
likelihood of voting for the second largest party or voting for the incumbent. The odds 
of a person who felt satisfaction, voting for ND compared to voting for the incumbent, 
are 3.29 times more than a person who felt dissatisfaction and 2.27 times more than a 
person who felt neither satisfaction nor dissatisfaction. In other words, people that 
were satisfied with the state of the economy in 2004 were more likely to cast their 
vote for the second largest party ND than for the government party PASOK. The 
variable was also significant in distinguishing between respondents who voted for 
third parties and respondents who voted for the incumbent party, recording an odds 
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ratio of 3.95 for those that were dissatisfied with the economy. This indicates that 
respondents who felt discontent with the economic situation were almost 4 times more 
likely to vote for an opposition small party than vote for the incumbent PASOK, 
compared to those that felt satisfaction. Additionally, the odds ratio of 2.17 for those 
that had neutral feelings about the economic conditions, indicates that these voters 
were over 2 times more likely to vote for third parties than vote for the incumbent 
PASOK, compared to the satisfied with the economy voters. Finally, the predictor 
was not significant in predicting the likelihood of voting for the incumbent or non-
voting.  
         The variable income made a statistical significant contribution to this first 
model, recording an odds ratio of 2.88 for the respondents coping on present income. 
This indicates that these respondents were almost 3 times more likely to vote for third 
parties than vote for the incumbent, compared to respondents finding it very difficult 
on their income. Respondents finding it difficult on their income were 2.64 times 
more likely to vote for third parties than vote for the government party, compared to 
respondents finding it very difficult on their income. Finally, voters that were living 
comfortably on present income, were 50% less likely to abstain in the 2004 elections 
than vote for PASOK, compared to voters finding it very difficult on their income.  
 
 
Second model 
The full model, containing all predictors was statistically significant χ2 (51) = 
1611.92, p < .001, indicating that the model was able to distinguish between 
respondents who voted for the government party, for the second largest party, for 
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third parties or did not vote. The model as a whole explained between 79% and 89% 
of the variance in vote choice and correctly classified 91.8% of cases.  
         The results for the 2004 election year, demonstrate that the predictors that made 
a unique statistically significant contribution to the overall relationship between the 
vote variable and the independent variables of the study, were the age of the 
respondents, their level of education, their placement on the left-right scale and their 
identification with a particular party.  The economic variable, the participation in 
demonstrations, the unemployment, the income and the gender of the respondents did 
not make a significant contribution to the full model.  
         Looking at the effects of each predictor on the four outcome categories, it is 
observed that the main variable of interest- the economic factor- was not significant in 
the 2004 election year once the control variables were entered in the analysis. The 
satisfaction of the respondents with the economic situation in the pre-crisis period, did 
not significantly predict the likelihood of voting for the incumbent party or another 
party or whether they abstained from the elections. The party identification variable 
was the most significant predictor of the final model. Voters that felt close to one of 
the third smaller parties in the opposition, were more likely to vote for ND than for 
the incumbent party PASOK. The odds of the respondent who feels close to one of the 
opposition parties, voting for ND compared to voting for PASOK is 5.26 times more 
than for a respondent who feels close to PASOK. Additionally, a person who 
identified with ND was 98.1% less likely to vote for third parties than vote for the 
incumbent, compared to a person that identified with one these opposition parties. 
Regarding the probability of abstention in the 2004 elections, it is observed that 
respondents who sympathized one of the small parties, were 2.86 times more likely to 
abstain than voting for the incumbent, compared to those who sympathized PASOK.  
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         The ideological variable was the second significant predictor of vote choice in 
2004. The main observations from the effect of ideology on voting preference, is that 
voters who placed themselves on the center of the ideological continuum were 88.3 % 
less likely to vote for ND than for the incumbent party, compared to someone with 
right-wind ideology and voters with left-wing ideology were 85.4% less likely to vote 
for ND than vote for the incumbent PASOK, compared to voters that placed 
themselves on the right of the ideological scale. Moreover, the odds of a person who 
affiliated with the right, abstaining rather than voting for the incumbent party, were 
4.18 times more than for a leftist person and 6.5 times more than a person with a 
center-left ideology. 
         The age was the third significant predictor to the final model, however it was not 
significant in distinguishing all outcome categories. It is observed that as it increases, 
the likelihood of abstaining than voting for the incumbent increases. The odds ratio of 
the third age group, shows that survey respondents whose age was 70 years or more, 
were 5.02 times more likely to abstain than vote for the incumbent, compared to 
middle-aged respondents. The last significant contributor to the model, was the 
education. The variable significantly predicted whether the respondents voted for the 
second largest party, or for the incumbent party. The odds of a person with a high 
educational level, voting for ND compared to voting for PASOK is 5.38 times more 
than a person who has attained a medium level of education.  
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7.2.2 The Elections of 2009 
First model 
The first model , containing only the economic predictors, was statistically significant 
χ2 (18) = 46.82, p < .001, indicating that the model was able to distinguish between 
respondents who voted for the government party, for the second largest party, for 
third parties or did not vote. The model as a whole explained between 26% and 28% 
of the variance in vote choice and correctly classified 35% of cases. Among the three 
variables, the unemployment and the satisfaction with the economy were statistically 
significant contributors to the overall relationship between the dependent and the 
independent variables, while the income was not significant in predicting membership 
of the four outcome categories.  
        Looking at the individual effects however, the satisfaction with the economy was 
not significant in distinguishing whether the respondent voted for the incumbent party 
ND, for PASOK, for an alternative opposition party or abstained. The unemployment 
was significant in predicting the likelihood of voting for third parties or voting for the 
incumbent. The odds ratio indicates that as the variable changes from not unemployed 
to unemployed, the change in the odds of voting for third parties compared to voting 
for the incumbent is 0.34. In short, unemployed respondents were more likely to vote 
for a third party than vote for the government. Additionally, unemployed respondents 
were more likely to abstain than vote for the incumbent. The odds ratio of 0.44 
indicates that for one more unit of unemployment, respondents were 0.44 more likely 
to abstain.  
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Second model 
The full model designed for the 2009 elections, containing all predictors was 
statistically significant χ2 (51) = 1226.18, p <  .001, indicating that the model was able 
to distinguish between respondents who voted for the government party, for the 
second largest party, for third parties or did not vote. The model as a whole explained 
between 84.6% and 92.1% of the variance in vote choice and correctly classified 
90.5% of cases. 
         The variables that made a unique statistically significant contribution to the 
model, were again the education and the party identification and the age, but not the 
left-right placement, which was significant in the 2004 model. The rest of the 
variables that were controlled for; satisfaction with the economy, income, gender, 
unemployment and participation in demonstration, did not have a statistical 
significant relationship with the vote variable.  
         Looking at the effects of each predictor on the four outcome categories, it is 
again observed that the economic variable of the study is not significant in the three 
vote categories, contrary to the expectations. However, the variable was significant in 
distinguishing the likelihood of abstention from the likelihood of voting for the 
incumbent party. Specifically, respondents that were dissatisfied with the state of the 
economy were more likely to abstain in the 2009 elections, than casting their vote for 
the incumbent party ND, compared to those that were satisfied or those that were 
neither dissatisfied nor satisfied. Again, the party identification of the respondents 
was the most significant contributor to the model, recording an odds ratio of 57.4 for 
the party identification with the second largest party. This indicates that respondents 
who felt sympathy for the second largest party PASOK were over 57 times more 
likely to vote for it, compared to voting for the incumbent, than those who felt 
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sympathy for one of the third parties.  The odds ratio of 0.08 for the party 
identification with PASOK, indicates that for one more unit (of party identification 
with PASOK) respondents were 0.08 less likely to vote for third parties, compared to 
vote for the incumbent, than respondents who felt close to third parties. Finally, the 
odds ratio of 5.08 for the respondents that have an attachment with PASOK, indicates 
that respondents who were loyal to PASOK, were 5.08 times more likely to abstain 
compared to the respondents who felt sympathy for one of the smaller parties. In other 
words, a person who identified with a party other than the two traditional, was less 
likely to abstain than vote for the incumbent.  
         The second most significant predictor of the model, was the education of the 
respondents. Survey respondents with a medium level of education were 85.6% less 
likely to vote for PASOK than vote for the incumbent, compared to voters that have 
attained a high education level. Similarly, respondents that have attained a basic level 
of education, were 91.8% less likely to vote for PASOK than vote for the government, 
compared to respondents with a high level of education. However, the variable was 
not significant in distinguishing whether the respondent voted for third parties or for 
the incumbent, as well as whether he abstained or voted for the incumbent. Finally, 
the third most significant contributor to the model was the variable age. Respondents 
that belonged to the youngest age group 18-29 or in the next age group 30-49, were 
96.6% and 88.2% respectively, less likely to cast their vote for PASOK than cast their 
vote for the government, that those respondents that belonged to the oldest age group. 
Surprisingly enough, these age groups were also less likely to vote for third parties 
than vote for the incumbent. The odds of an old person voting for third parties 
compared to voting for the incumbent ND, are 16.3 times more than for a person aged 
between 30 and 49. Additionally, the odds of an old person abstaining compared to 
45 
 
voting for the government, are 3.84 times more than for a person aged between 30 and 
49. 
 
 
7.3 Evaluation of Results and Hypotheses 
7.3.1 Assessment of the 2004 Models of Electoral Choice 
The most important observations from the first electoral model can be summarized as 
follows: 
 The satisfaction of the respondents with the state of the economy in 2004 was 
a significant predictor of their voting preference. Specifically, satisfied 
respondents with the economy were more likely to vote for the second largest 
party ND than vote for the government party PASOK. Therefore, they were 
not likely to reward the incumbent with their vote, even though their 
retrospective economic evaluations were positive.  
 Dissatisfied respondents with the state of the economy, were more likely to 
cast their vote for third parties than for the incumbent PASOK, as well as 
respondents that were neither dissatisfied nor satisfied. This indicates that 
third opposition parties were more likely to gain votes from respondents that 
did not feel satisfaction with the economic conditions.  
 The income also contributed significantly to the model. Those that could cope 
on their income in 2004, or found it difficult on their income, were more likely 
to cast their vote for third parties. Additionally, it was twice more likely for 
respondents with very low income to abstain than vote for the incumbent, 
compared to respondents with high income. Therefore, negative evaluations of 
personal economic conditions are likely to guide voters to abstention.         
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In the full model, where controls are entered, the results differ greatly: 
 The satisfaction with the economy did not have a significant effect on vote 
choice, whereas the long-term components, party identification and 
ideological orientation, strongly predicted voting behavior. Voters that felt 
close to one of the two main parties, either the incumbent PASOK or ND, 
were far more likely to cast their vote for the party they identified with. 
Additionally, respondents that did not identify with one of the traditional 
parties, were more likely to vote for the ND than the incumbent and were also 
more likely to abstain, compared to the other voters. The left-right orientation 
was also a strong determinant of electoral behavior and respondents followed 
their ideological views when they made their political decision. Voters with 
center-left or left ideological views, were more likely to vote in favor of the 
incumbent party PASOK. Additionally, voters that placed themselves on the 
right of the scale, were more likely to abstain than vote for the government.  
 With regard to the socio-demographic factors that were found to determine 
vote choice in the 2004 full model, it was observed that people in the oldest 
age group were more likely to abstain than vote for the incumbent, compared 
to the previous age groups. However, this is probably due to the fact that old 
people do not often proceed to the ballot, rather than an indication of 
discontent with the government. Finally, respondents who have attained a high 
educational level are more likely to vote for the second largest party ND, than 
vote for the government.  
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7.3.2 Assessment of the 2009 Models of Electoral Choice 
The most important observations from the first electoral model can be summarized as 
follows: 
 The main variable of interest, satisfaction with economy, significantly 
contributed to the whole model, however the predictor was not significant in 
distinguishing among the different vote choices. Income was not a statistically 
significant predictor. Therefore, it is unlikely that either sociotropic or 
egocentric evaluations mattered to electoral behavior.  
 Unemployment was the only significant variable that predicted the 
membership of the four outcome categories. Unemployed Greeks were more 
likely to cast their vote for a small opposition party or abstain, rather than vote 
for the incumbent ND. 
In the full model, where the control variables are added, the results only slightly 
differ: 
 The satisfaction of voters with the economy was only significant in 
distinguishing support for the government or non-voting. Dissatisfaction with 
the economy was more likely to predict abstention than government support 
compared to satisfaction.  
 Party identification had the strongest effect on electoral choice in 2009 
elections. Again voters followed their partisan loyalties with one of the two 
traditional parties, or with a third alternative party. Additionally, PASOK 
sympathizers were more likely to abstain than vote for the incumbent party 
ND, compared to sympathizers of an alternative small party, which reveals the 
strong competition between the two parties and their supporters. However 
voters in this election were not likely to vote according to their ideology.  
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 Education and age were again significant determinants of electoral choice. 
Voters that have attained a high level of education were less likely to vote for 
the incumbent party than vote for the second largest party. Similar to the 2004 
results, highly educated Greeks are less likely to support the incumbent party 
again. In respect to the effect of the age, it is observed that as it increases the 
likelihood of voting for the incumbent decreases, whereas the likelihood of 
voting for another party or non-voting increases.  
 
 
7.3.3 Evaluation of Hypotheses 
In the 2004 national elections, the economic voting theories would be partly 
confirmed, if long-term factors had not such a strong effect on vote choice. In 2004, 
when the economy was relatively good, Greek voters were not likely to reward the 
incumbent with their support, while dissatisfied with the economy citizens would be 
more likely to cast their vote for third parties, rather than the incumbent. However, the 
economic evaluations do not remain important, once controls for other factors are 
applied. As expected, in this election the economic conditions did not matter to 
voters’ choice, whereas partisan loyalties and ideological orientations strongly 
affected party choice or “no” choice. 
         In 2009 national elections, when the country was already hit by the economic 
crisis, perceptions of the national economy were not powerful in predicting vote 
choice neither in the first model, nor in the second full model. Discontent with the 
state of the economy was likely to have influenced only citizens that decided not to 
cast their ballot. Contrary to the expectations, the identification with a political party 
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played again the biggest role in electoral behavior, whereas the effect of ideological 
views seems to have diminished.  
         On the basis of these findings, the first hypothesis H1 of the study, which 
predicted that the two traditional incumbent parties in Greece lost electoral support 
due to the poor national economic conditions as a result of the current financial 
crisis, should be rejected. 
         And the second hypothesis H2, which predicted that after the onset of the 
economic crisis, a significant number of Greek voters shifted to competing, smaller 
parties that are not considered responsible for the national economic situation, 
should also be rejected.  
 
 
8. Conclusion and Discussion 
The study examined the relationship between the electoral behavior of Greek citizens 
and the economy, in the 2004 and 2009 elections. The purpose was to discover the 
consequences of the economic crisis on vote choice and provide an answer to the 
question of whether decreased support for the two traditional incumbent parties and 
increased support for the opposition parties could be attributed to the deterioration of 
the national economy. The analysis demonstrated that electoral volatility cannot be 
explained by the economic factor, since it was not found to have an influence on the 
voting behavior of the Greek electorate neither in the period of financial stability, nor 
after the emergence of the crisis. The study does not offer any support to the theory of 
the economic voting and the significance of the retrospective judgments of citizens in 
Greece.  
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         Although a great number of economic voting studies have stressed the 
dominance of the reward-punishment model, when the economy in a nation is 
deteriorating, findings do not always confirm the hypothesis. As Lewis-Beck and 
Paldam (2000) explain, results vary from country to country and from time to time. 
Vote and electoral outcomes are in many cases unpredictable and so are the 
determinants of vote choice. Future analyses on the 2012 Greek legislative elections 
will definitely shed more light on the relationship between the economy and the vote 
and may demonstrate a stronger effect of the economic perceptions and a diminished 
effect of partisanship. Nevertheless, the role of the economy on vote should not be 
exaggerated and generalized.  
         Although the study does not offer support to the economic voting hypotheses, 
some interesting findings with regard to the electoral behavior in Greece and the 
determinants of party choice should be pointed out. Partisan loyalties that have 
affected political decisions in Greece historically, continue to have a strong impact in 
recent times. The Michigan model of party identification can fit into the Greek 
electoral context more adequately. Greek voters seem to be highly influenced by long-
term components, an effect that cannot easily be reduced, even if severe issues 
emerge, such as the current economic recession. Although the “two-partyism” is now 
facing a gradual erosion, the condition strongly represented the political landscape 
until the first years of the 21st century. On the other hand, there is enough evidence of 
an erosion of the ideological cleavages due to a process of “modernization”, which 
seems to emerge in Greek politics. 
         The increasing levels of abstention in recent national elections seem worrying 
and this development does not only reveal a distrust in the traditional incumbent 
parties, but also an indifference in politics in general. Political scandals, 
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irresponsibility of parties, past financial mismanagement and strict measures that were 
imposed in such difficult times, provide good reasons for citizens to abstain. Many of 
them hold the view that their vote will not entail any improvements in national or 
personal conditions. However as many scholars have stressed, abstention is not the 
best option to force political leaders to be responsive to citizens in terms of policy 
preferences. The consequences of this stance may be severe for the proper democratic 
function of the political system and since the country continues to experience such an 
economic instability, it is unlikely that the situation will soon change.  
 
 
8.1 Contribution and Limitations  
From a scientific and societal aspect, the present research offers useful information 
for political science students that are interested in investigating the determinants of 
Greek voting behavior in recent times. Information could be also useful for scholars, 
who seek to do further research on the Greek case, or a comparative analysis 
including Greece. The existing available studies on the explanation of electoral 
outcomes in Greece are limited and usually not based on data from recent elections. 
Although limited to a single country, the case studies provide the researcher the 
opportunity to examine a situation or a process in depth. The analysis was also limited 
to two selected years, however the selection was appropriate for a comparative 
analysis of electoral choice, before and after the emergence of the recession.   
         A few limitations of the study should also be mentioned. Firstly, an analysis of 
the most recent 2012 legislative elections in Greece would probably offer a better 
opportunity for testing both hypotheses of the study, since the official election results 
pointed to a great electoral volatility. Both past incumbent parties lost electoral 
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support to a large degree, whereas several right-wing and left-wing parties in the 
opposition, gained votes far from all expectations. Nevertheless, the elections are very 
recent and there are not available published data, which would allow for a comparison 
with this election year. As a concluding part, a few observations from the results of 
this election will be made. In general, research on the economic voting theory in 
Greece confronts difficulties, due to the lack of national election study and the non-
availability of comparable questions on assessments about the economy (Nezi, 2012). 
Secondly, the study excludes several dimensions that might have contributed to 
different findings. Although only limited support was found for the significance of the 
economic issue and for the economic voting theory, whereas strong evidence was 
found for the impact of party loyalties, other short-term issues might have proved 
quite important. As mentioned in the literature review, various single issues attract 
voter’s attention nowadays in different electoral contexts. The examination of the 
impact of these factors was not part of the paper, however they are likely to have 
affected the outcomes of Greek elections in the last few years. Candidates’ 
personalities, campaign events, political debates, evaluations of political leaders’ 
performance and even media coverage of their private lives, are decisive elements in 
several electoral outcomes11. Future research may offer interesting insights into the 
effect of these factors. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11 For two decades now, the media play a crucial role in Greece, as an “area of representation of 
political action” (Lyrintzis, 2005).  
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8.2 The 2012 Parliamentary Elections; the transition from a two-party to a 
multi-party system 
After the failure of the two traditional parties to handle effectively the country’s exit 
from the crisis, PASOK’s prime minister agreed to resign, for the purpose of the 
formation of a new coalition government that would secure the EU bailout plan and 
prepare the ground for new national elections. When elections were announced, the 
Greek political landscape had little in common with the previous years. New parties 
had entered the competition, a division between the supporters and the opponents of 
the Memorandum had emerged and the two main parties, with new elected leaders, 
had already suffered losses (Dinas and Rori, 2013).  
         The case of “two-partyism” that represented the Greek political system since 
2009, changed dramatically in 2012 (Dinas and Rori, 2013). In the 2012 Greek 
national elections, four years after the onset of the economic crisis, Greek voters were 
driven to the polls to make a difficult decision. The results of this parliamentary 
election were decisive for the country. Compared to the previous 2009 election, 
support for ND reduced almost to the half. However, the defeat for the incumbent 
party PASOK was greater. The results of May election12, demonstrated a dramatic 
loss in votes for both parties. Together they received less than 33% of the votes, while 
SYRIZA received 16.78% of the vote and the extreme right-wing party Golden Dawn 
received 6.97% of the votes13. The June election gave a small lead over SYRIZA 
(almost 3%) and PASOK came third with 12.28% of the vote. The second coalition 
government was formed (by PASOK, ND and DIMAR), since the restoration of 
democracy in the country and the two-party system came to an end. 
                                                          
12 Two elections were held in 2012, the first one in May and the second one in June, since the outcome 
of the first elections did not made possible for a new government to be formed.  
13 Official election results as published by the Ministry of the Interior. 
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         Evaluating the outcomes of these parliamentary elections, the main changes that 
clearly emerged were the defeat of the two traditional parties, greater fragmentation of 
the political power and increased polarization. It can be assumed that the bad 
economic mismanagement, the policies adopted by the two parties as incumbents and 
the strict economic measures imposed to the country, resulted in the end of the two-
party system. Future research will offer useful insights into the causes of this political 
outcome and their relation to the economic crisis.  
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Appendix 
1. Tables Bivariate Correlations 
 
 Table 3a. Bivariate Correlation (2004 Elections) 
  Satisfaction with 
National Economy 
Satisfaction with 
National Government 
Satisfaction with 
National Economy 
Pearson’s R 
N 
1 
2366 
,599** 
2288 
Satisfaction with 
National Government 
Pearson’s R 
N 
,599** 
2288 
1 
2303 
**Correlation significant at p< .001 
 
 
 Table 3b. Bivariate Correlation (2009 Elections) 
  Satisfaction with 
National Economy 
Satisfaction with 
National Government 
Satisfaction with 
National Economy 
Pearson’s R 
N 
1 
2642 
,597** 
2618 
Satisfaction with 
National Government 
Pearson’s R 
N 
,597** 
2618 
1 
2620 
**Correlation significant at p< .001 
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2. Tables Logistic Regression Analyses 
 
Table 4a. Multinomial Logistic Regression (2004 Elections) 
Reference: Voted for Incumbent (PASOK) 
 Voted for ND 
B (SE) 
Voted for Third 
Parties 
B (SE) 
 Abstention 
B (SE) 
Satisfaction with 
National Economy 
(Satisfied = 3) 
   
  Dissatisfied -1.191*** (0.230) 1.374* (0.548) -0.356 (0.331) 
  Neutral -0.821*** (0.231) 0.776 (0.557) -0.247 (0.335) 
Income (Finding it 
Very Difficult = 4) 
   
  Living Comfortably -0.233 (0.254) 0.727** (0.417) -0.696* (0.362) 
  Coping 0.066 (0.191) 1.057*** (0.326) -0.401 (0.249) 
  Finding it Difficult 0.323 (0.194) 0.970** (0.332) 0.217 (0.241) 
Unemployment (Yes 
=1) 
   
  Not Unemployed 0.421 (0.296) -0.125 (0.381) -0.025 (0.350) 
Constant 0.873* (0.376) -2.768*** (0.700) -0.250 (0.480) 
N   1555 
-2 log likelihood   227.29 
Cox and Snell R²   0.068 
Nagelkerke R²   0.075 
χ² (df)   110.25 (18) 
Satisfaction with 
National Economy 
(Satisfied = 3) 
   
  Dissatisfied -0.853 (0.678) 1.608 (1.556) -0.344 (0.698) 
  Neutral -0.820 (0.689) 1.392 (1.557) -0.487 (0.713) 
Income (Finding it 
Very Difficult = 4) 
   
  Living Comfortably -1.154 (0.804) 1.448 (1.239) -0.624 (0.805) 
  Coping -0.833 (0.589) 0.401 (0.973) -0.125 (0.546) 
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  Finding it Difficult -0.661 (0.624) 0.763 (0.972) -0.064 (0.577) 
Unemployment (Yes 
= 1) 
   
  Not Unemployed -1.280 (0.757) -0.138 (1.107) -0.715 (0.697) 
Gender (Female = 2)    
  Male -0.001 (0.389) -0.123 (0.562) -0.307 (0.379) 
Age (70 and over = 
4) 
   
  18-29 0.379 (0.739) -0.555 (1.074) -0.209 (0.684) 
  30-49 0.434 (0.615) -0.195 (0.905) -0.863 (0.582) 
  50-69 0.650 (0.582) 0.772 (0.899) -1.615** (0.619) 
Education level 
(High = 3) 
   
  Basic -0.708 (0.684) -0.538 (0.981) -0.117 (0.735) 
  Medium -1.683** (0.635) -0.281 (0.823) 0.125 (0.662) 
Party Identification 
(Third Parties = 3) 
   
  PASOK -3.943*** (0.852) -27.588 (0.000) -3.340*** (0.753) 
  ND 3.219*** (0.919) -3.960*** (1.060) -0.377 (0.897) 
Left-Right Placement 
(Right = 3) 
   
  Left -1.925* (0.876) -0.450 (1.021) -1.431* (0.847) 
  Center-Left -2.142** (0.616) -1.060 (0.938) -1.868** (0.683) 
Participation in 
Demonstration (No = 
2) 
   
  Yes -0.522 (0.858) 0.169 (0.997) -0.488 (0.856) 
Constant 5.543*** (1.606) 2.159 (2.493) 4.305** (1.585) 
N   1034 
-2 log likelihood   2124.57 
Cox and Snell R²   0.790 
Nagelkerke R²   0.890 
χ² (df)   1611.92 (51) 
* p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001 
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Table 4a. Multinomial Logistic Regression (2009 Elections) 
Reference: Voted for Incumbent (ND) 
 Voted for PASOK 
B (SE) 
Voted for Third 
Parties 
B (SE) 
 Abstention 
B (SE) 
Satisfaction with 
National Economy 
(Satisfied = 3) 
   
  Dissatisfied -0.527 (0.590) 0.494 (0.872) -0.056 (0.652) 
  Neutral -0.200 (0.631) 0.238 (0.929) -0.228 (0.696) 
Income (Finding it 
Very Difficult = 4) 
   
  Living Comfortably -0.106 (0.289) -0.311 (0.366) -0.567 (0.316) 
  Coping 0.092 (0.185) 0.119 (0.215) -0.232 (0.189) 
  Finding it Difficult -0.081 (0.181) -0.178 (0.216) -0.034 (0.181) 
Unemployment (Yes 
=1) 
   
  Not Unemployed -0.501 (0.321) -1.072*** (0.336) -0.822** (0.312) 
Constant 1.589 (0.672) 0.392 (0.935) -1.415* (0.723) 
N   1745 
-2 log likelihood   198.25 
Cox and Snell R²   0.026 
Nagelkerke R²   0.028 
χ² (df)   46.82 (18) 
Satisfaction with 
National Economy 
(Satisfied = 3) 
   
  Dissatisfied -1.492 (6.214) 11.210 (5.808) 16.023*** (0.939) 
  Neutral -1.443 (6.263) 11.643 (5.808) 15.704 (0.000) 
Income (Finding it 
Very Difficult = 4) 
   
  Living Comfortably -0.895 (1.487) -2.671 (1.792) -1.068 (1.076) 
  Coping -0.849 (0.855) -1.523 (1.073) -0.802 (0.653) 
  Finding it Difficult -1.017 (0.799) -2.767** (0.978) -0.549 (0.587) 
Unemployment (Yes 
= 1) 
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  Not Unemployed -2.000 (1.217) -1.447 (1.266) -1.327 (0.995) 
Gender (Female = 2)    
  Male 0.270 (0.611) 0.112 (0.729) -0.363 (0.472) 
Age (70 and over = 
4) 
   
  18-29 -3.390** (1.365) -4.127* (1.672) -1.863 (1.186) 
  30-49 -2.137** (0.946) -2.792 *(1.223) -1.323* (0.702) 
  50-69 -0.561 (0.800) -0.319 (1.081) -0.603 (0.541) 
Education level 
(High = 3) 
   
  Basic -2.507** (1.214) -1.595 (1.322) -0.652 (0.971) 
  Medium -1.939 (1.139) 0.093 (1.181) 0.207 (0.925) 
Party Identification 
(Third Parties = 3) 
   
  ND -7.713*** (1.832) -10.907*** (1.830) -4.631*** (1.388) 
  PASOK 4.050** (1.712) -4.823* (1.969) 1.626 (1.665) 
Left-Right Placement 
(Right = 3) 
   
  Left -2.506 (1.929) 2.958 (1.819) 1.815 (1.683) 
  Center-Left 0.710 (1.206) 0.678 (1.170) -0.373 (0.821) 
Participation in 
Demonstration (No = 
2) 
   
  Yes -0.937 (1.291) 0.153 (1.295) -1.765 (1.311) 
Constant 8.552 (6.752) -2.080*** (5.809) -10.837*** (2.364) 
N   656 
-2 log likelihood   330.373 
Cox and Snell R²   0.846 
Nagelkerke R²   0.921 
χ² (df)   1226.18 (51) 
* p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001 
 
